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1. Introduction
Abstract

Vastly increased research and a sounder technique in history in the nineteenth century had two influences on
the social sciences. When an enthusiasm for the records of history was combined with the evolutionary
perspective, it often resulted in the search for and the imposition of patterns of development on history in
general or on the history of particular subject matters such as economics, politics, morals, or religion. Social
scientists looked to history for explanations, in the hope of finding inevitable laws, stages of development, or
the forces that moved human society. As historians worked out a critical method for their subject matter
which more accurately and justly portrayed the complex record of past events, the social scientists were
stimulated to adopt the same approach to their own subject matters. They turned to composing histories
instead of creating sciences. To many, economics became the history of economic institutions; political
science, the history of political institutions; anthropology, the history of civilizations, societies, and cultures.
Psychology was relatively immune to this influence and turned toward an experimental method. [excerpt]
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More About Contemporary Civilization:
From 1947 through 1969, all first-year Gettysburg College students took a two-semester course called
Contemporary Civilization. The course was developed at President Henry W.A. Hanson’s request with the
goal of “introducing the student to the backgrounds of contemporary social problems through the major
concepts, ideals, hopes and motivations of western culture since the Middle Ages.”
Gettysburg College professors from the history, philosophy, and religion departments developed a textbook
for the course. The first edition, published in 1955, was called An Introduction to Contemporary Civilization and
Its Problems. A second edition, retitled Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, was published in 1958 and 1960.
It is this second edition that we include here. The copy we digitized is from the Gary T. Hawbaker ’66
Collection and the marginalia are his.
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MEANING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

lo

Introduction

In the chapter on the eighteenth century Enlightenment, we
saw the beginning of the contemporary social sciences of psy
chology, economics, and political science. The method of these
sciences was the deduction of laws from axioms or propositions
mgde from observations, however limited, of human experience;
the goal was a deductive, universal, necessary system of truth.
Succeeding chapters showed the application of the conclusions
reached in these sciences to economic and political affairs.
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, the method,
goal, and conclusions of the eighteenth century science of man
were the predominant ideas animating the social sciences and
the accepted economic, political, and moral doctrines.
In Chapter XV we saw the impact of biology and Darwin's
idea of evolution upon men's minds and upon the new social
sciences of anthropology and sociology. Biology and evolution
gave a new orientation to the social sciences and a set of new
conceptions and premises that have continued to influence them
to the present day. First, the universe, man, and society
were conceived as changing and growing processes and not as
static and fixed constructions. Time and change were distinc
tive characteristics of all subject matters. Investigation of
the scientific processes of change in man and his institutions
became a part of every science. Second, biology, psychology
and anthropology were placed in a prominent position rather
than physics and mathematics. Man was an organism acting in
the context of the physical and social environment. The rela
tion between man and his environment was a complex system of
action and reaction. Third, the naturalistic and humanistic
attitudes were reinforced. Man, more than ever before, was
placed directly in nature as one of its products and species,
subject to all natural laws, and to be studied by the natural
sciences. Some stressed the part that man played in directing
and controlling evolutionary change. For them, the selection
of goals and values became of the utmost importance. Fourth,
knowledge was looked at from a new perspective. It was a
specific form of biological adaptation; man's keenest instru
ment for the successful maintenance of life. Knowledge, ideas,
science were seen as subject to change and development. The
aspects of tentativity and relativity received increased attention.
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There were, however, short-range influences of evolution
and biology that produced some striking theories which had
their heyday in the nineteenth century. Chapter XV described
in some detail the theory of social Darwinism as expressed by
Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner. The social scien
tists borrowed biology's categories of the struggle for exist
ence, natural selection and the survival of the fittest, and
interpreted the activities of races, groups, and institutions
through them, ignoring the possibility of differences between
social and organic evolution and the possibility of other
categories. The conception of social organism was borrowed
from biology and made the bagiis of many economic, political,
and social theories. Society and the state were conceived as
genuine living organisms forming a unity of functioning cells.
"The attempts to elaborate on this analogy forced the theorist
into certain patterns of thought, to the neglect of the study
of society, the state, and the economy as it actually existed
and functioned. Theories of the evolutionary development of
civilizations and institutions were created. Sociologists and
anthropologists especially worked out schemes showing the
stages of social and cultural development, and using fragmen
tary evidence of customs and ideas taken from different times,
places, and cultures, Herbert Spencer's system of the evolu
tion of civilization is an illustration of this type of ap
proach. The theories of social Darwinism, social organism, and
evolutionary development were still in the spirit of the eight
eenth century ideal of science as a universal, necessary system
of truth and the deductive method.

•

Vastly increased research and a sounder technique in his
tory in the nineteenth century had two influences on the social
sciences. When an enthusiasm for the records of history was
combined with the evolutionary perspective, it often resulted
in the search for and the imposition of patterns of development
on history in general or on the history of particular subject
matters such as economics, politics, morals, or religion. So
cial scientists looked to history for explanations, in the hope
of finding inevitable laws, stages of development, or the
forces that moved human society. As historians worked out a
critical method for their subject matter which more accurately
and justly portrayed the complex record of past events, the
social scientists were stimulated to adopt the same approach to
their own subject matters. They turned to composing histories
instead of creating sciences. To many, economics became the
history of economic institutions; political science, the history
of political institutions; anthropology, the history of civil
izations, societies, and cultures. Psychology was relatively
immune to this influence and turned toward an experimental
method.
The growth of psychology as an experimental science toward
the end of the nineteenth century seemed to provide a new orien
tation for the social sciences. Since the evolutionary and his- •
torical approaches had proven inadequate for the social sciences
as sciences, and since the conception of human nature was for
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them a fundamental one, psychology was looked to for aid. It
was hoped that a sound psychology could be made the basis for
theory and laws in economics, political science, anthropology,
and sociology. However, at first, the social sciences either
returned to the psychology of the Enlightenment, as in the case
of economics, or they selected certain very hypothetical con
clusions of the newer psychology and proceeded to build systems
around them. In sociology, for example, the factors of sym
pathy and imitation were isolated and made key explanatory prin
ciples by which all social phenomena could be explained. When
the irrational aspect of human behavior received attention,
sociologists based th6ir systems upon particular instincts such
as sex or "the herd," 6r upon a number of instincts which were
used to explain the actions of men.
As psychology matured as an experimental science, the in
stinct theory was rejected for more complex theories of the
motivation of behavior. Each of the social sciences has had to
reconstruct its theories and hypotheses in the light of the re
vised concept of man offered by such theories. They have had
to recognize that human beings are creatures of impulse, pas
sion, emotional preference, and habit, as well as reason; that
each man is an individual with different hereditary capacities
and attitudes, and a personality which is a unique synthesis;
and that men are largely the product of their society and cul
ture. The influence of anthropology, sociology, and history in
directing attention to the last factor illustrates the growing
impact of the social sciences upon each other.
By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of
the twentieth the social sciences had accumulated impressive
collections of factual information and devised innumerable con
cepts, hypotheses, and theories, but had discovered few, if any,
verified laws. This situation generated a critical and discrim
inating attitude among social scientists which directed their
efforts to two tasks; the gathering of more facts and the in
vestigation of methods of analysis. The first task usually took
the form of detailed arid specific ^inquiries into small areas of
research, in the hope that accuracy and completeness could be
attained, and that caii|al laws or correlations might be more
easily found. The second task has resulted in creating a new
subject, methodology, #ithin each of the social sciences. Cer
tain general trends can be discerned in this subject. No one
science, such as physics or biology, is singled out as a model;
instead different areas of inquiry are believed to require dif
fering intellectual instruments. Hypotheses and theories are
held extremely tentatively and suggested only if there is the
possLboLity of testing them by the available data. There is an
emphasis on experimental procedure, both narrowly conceived, as
in the use of control groups, and more broadly in the sense of
historical similarities, A constant attempt is made to present
data in quantitative form and to use statistics to find pos
sible correlations between quantitatively stated variables.
Finally, there is a return to historical, descriptive studies
of human behavior in all fields. These studies modestly hope

XXI

p. 4

to acquaint men with the variables that need to be known and
examined, rather than to yield laws of the relationships of
variables.
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century developments
in physics, mathematics, and philosophy have added to the crit
ical and sophisticated attitude of the social scientists. Each
of these subjects has emphasized the creative role of the
thinker in constructing concepts and theories, and the effect
of the observer upon what is being observed. Mathematicians
and logicians have devised a variety of deductive systems.
Philosophers, working in the fields of semantics, logic, and
the philosophy of science, have made men aware of the complex
problems inherent in the process of inquiry into every subject
matter. The philosophical movements known as pragmatism, log
ical empiricism, and analysis have vividly demonstrated that
men continue to give different answers to the question, "What
is scientific knowledge?"
The social sciences have been confronted with a particular
form of the above question. Are they to be classed as sciences
or studies? The crux of this question seems to be whether the
physical sciences are to be taken as the model of science. If
they are, then such procedures as exact quantitative measure
ment , laboratory experiments, and the formulation of laws which
yield prediction are necessary characteristics of science.
Judged by these criteria, psychology is the only subject which
could be classed even partially as a science. However, if we
mean by science the use of careful methods of observation and
classification, the use of statistics, the construction of hy
potheses and theories to organize and direct research, and the
ability to make predictions characterized by probability, then
we would class them as sciences.
This question appears somewhat academic when we become ac
quainted with the knowledge that does exist in the social sci
ences, and with their concern for methods of inquiry. Man has
expanded his knowledge of himself and his institutions, both in
amount and in direction. There is a degree of interrelation of
knowledge of subject matters that has not previously existed,
and there is a degree of application of the knowledge gained
that affects every aspect of our lives. Representatives of each
of the social sciences are employed in all branches of govern
ment, industry, business, foundations, and educational institu
tions. A new question has occurred in our day: If the social
sciences do allow us to control the direction of change, what
goals are to be selected and who selects them? In other words,
values or ethics, which had been divorced from the social sci
ences , now appear crucial.
This introduction has concentrated on the general character
istics and problems of the social sciences. The following sec
tions on economics, sociology, and psychology offer specific in
formation on these three subjects. Political science and anthro
pology have been omitted only for reasons of time and space.

